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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-4456 
 ___________ 
 
 XUEYA ZENG, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A99-683-701) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Henry S. Dogin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 1, 2010 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed  November 5, 2010 ) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Xueya Zeng, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, entered the United States 
in 2001 as a visitor.  She overstayed her visa, and the Government subsequently charged 
her with removability.  Zeng conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding, 
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), claiming that as a mother of 
two children she would be forcibly sterilized on her return to China.   
 The Immigration Judge (“IJ”), while recognizing that the law was unclear in this 
area, granted Zeng asylum based on future persecution (either sterilization or a forced 
abortion if she became pregnant again).  On the Government’s appeal, the BIA reversed.  
The BIA remanded the matter, directing the IJ to decisions issued after the IJ’s ruling, 
namely Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007), Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 247 (BIA 2007), and Yu v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 513 F.3d 346 (3d 
Cir. 2008).   
 On remand, relying on Matter of J-W-S- and concluding that Zeng had not shown 
that China had a policy of sterilizing persons because of the number of children born 
abroad, the IJ denied Zeng’s applications.  Zeng appealed.  The BIA, rejecting Zeng’s 
efforts to distinguish her case from the earlier BIA cases based on new and different 
evidence, dismissed her appeal.   
 Zeng presents a petition for review.  We have jurisdiction over Zeng=s petition 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We consider questions of law de novo.  See Gerbier v. Holmes, 
280 F.3d 297, 302 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review factual findings for substantial 
evidence.  See Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 2005).    
 First, she contends that the IJ did not consider the facts of her case when he based 
his denial largely on Matter of J-W-S-, and presents the related argument that the BIA 
should have remanded her case to the IJ for further fact-finding instead of reviewing the 
facts in her case de novo.  Zeng is right that the IJ focused primarily Matter of J-W-S-.  
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However, the case, binding precedent for the IJ, is very similar to Zeng’s.  Also, the IJ 
did consider Zeng’s testimony and documentation about others who faced sterilization, 
noting that except for saying that she knew of someone who returned from Sidney was 
sterilized, she did not present evidence that a person who had children in the United 
States faced sterilization on return to China.  R. 60.  He also surveyed the record.  Id. 
(“Nothing has been submitted from any source that a person who has a child or children 
overseas would be sterilized.”) 
   Even if the IJ did not discuss the evidence to the degree Zeng would have 
preferred, the BIA specifically addressed the evidence that Zeng highlighted on appeal as 
distinguishing her case from Matter of J-W-S-, including the 1997 Letter and 2003 
Consular Information Sheet, describing them accurately as stating in pertinent part that 
China does not recognize dual-nationality of children born abroad to Chinese parents.  R. 
470, 619.  The BIA also considered the 2006 Policy Statement, and cited information 
considered in Matter of J-W-S-, namely that the 2007 Country Report included 
information that children who are not registered as permanent residents of China are not 
counted against the number of children allowed under China’s family planning laws.  The 
BIA also cited Liu v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, in which we noted similar BIA 
findings based on the 2007 Country Report, and stated that “it seems entirely logical that 
Chinese officials would exclude United States citizens when considering its birth control 
policies, as such persons are likely to live in this country, at least if not registered as 
permanent residents of China.” 555 F.3d 145, 150 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009).  In considering the 
evidence, the BIA did not apply the wrong standards of review, which it correctly 
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identified as “clearly erroneous” for findings of fact and de novo for other issues. 
Second, Zeng argues that the BIA did not give sufficient weight to her credible 
testimony regarding the enforcement of the one-child policy – in particular, her testimony 
that her mother, cousins, and other individuals were forcibly sterilized and that her 
children would be counted under the policy upon their return to China and their 
registration for school.  The BIA did not mention Zeng=s intent to register her children.  
(Zeng testified that she would register her children as members of the household so that 
they could attend school, a fact the IJ accepted in his first decision.  R. 211 & 186.  And 
the 2006 Country Report notes that A[w]ithout official residence status, it was difficult or 
impossible to gain full access to social services, including education.@  R. 299.)  
Furthermore, despite her presumed credibility, the BIA questioned whether sterilizations 
Zeng described as “forcibly” or “coercively” done were actually forced or coerced.  
 Nonetheless, other than the testimony that Zeng had heard from her mother, who 
had heard from someone else, that an unnamed person from Sidney had been sterilized on 
her return to China, R. 74-75, none of the reports of forcible sterilization related to 
Chinese nationals returning to their country of origin.  As in Liu, the record supports the 
conclusion that the evidence does not establish that Chinese couples returning to China 
are subject to forced sterilization after giving birth to children in the United States.  
See 555 F.3d at 149-50; cf. Zheng v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 549 F.3d 260, 
268-69 (3d Cir. 2008).   
More specifically, the evidence in the record does not support the conclusion that 
Zeng herself will be subject to forced sterilization on her return to China, whether or not 
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she registers her children.  See Huang v. United States INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 
2005).  Furthermore, the BIA=s rejection of a claim of economic persecution based on 
potential fines (to the extent that Zeng sought to present such a claim) is supported by the 
record.  For these reasons, we hold that the BIA did not err in concluding that Zeng was 
not eligible for asylum, withholding, and CAT relief.  We will deny her petition for 
review.   
